



Naval competition in the Asia–Pacific
Sheryn Lee
A naval arms race in Asia?
Over more than a decade, many Asia–Pacific countries 
have increased their defence expenditure and started to 
modernise their military capabilities, particularly in the 
air and naval domains. This led to a debate about whether 
the region was subject to a destabilising arms race—a 
progressive and competitive increase in armaments by two 
or more states resulting from conflicting purposes or mutual 
fears.1 A 2008 ASPI study concluded that this explanation 
was too simplistic and that ‘many different motivations exist 
concurrently, and the resources that various countries can 
bring to bear vary markedly, resulting in a many-faceted 
picture’.2 To what degree is that assessment still true? After 
all, the strategic context was different in 2008. In particular, 
the global financial crisis, which began in that year, had set 
back defence reform programs across the region. And China 
was only at the beginning of its comprehensive efforts to 
change the regional maritime order in its favour.
Decisions on arms acquisitions in the Asia–Pacific continue to 
be driven by a multitude of strategic rationales and domestic 
factors. However, significant changes since 2008 raises the 
question regarding the primary motivation behind regional 
naval acquisitions, including supporting air capabilities. 
Maritime disputes between China and its neighbours have 
increased tensions and affected countries’ modernisation 
programs. For instance, maritime tensions have driven the 
requirement for greater maritime surveillance capabilities, 
signals intelligence systems, surface combatants with longer 
endurance, platforms able to launch anti-ship missiles, 
submarines, and longer range aircraft.
Japanese Soryu class submarines. Japan is in the process of increasing its submarine fleet from 16 to 22 as part of its military modernisation. Photo 
courtesy Japan Maritime Self-Defense Forces.
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As well, the maritime disputes occur in the context of 
heightened uncertainty about the future distribution of 
regional power, particularly between the US and China. 
Consequently, regional naval arms decisions are increasingly 
driven by action–reaction dynamics3—reciprocal dynamics 
in which developments in offensive and defensive 
capabilities become an interactive process in which the 
arms requirements of one party depend upon the known, 
assumed or anticipated capabilities of the forces of other 
parties. They’re manifested in counter-reaction (where one 
party responds to another’s capabilities) and mirror-reaction 
(where a party imitates another’s capabilities).
In short, these dynamics display some of the important 
characteristics of an arms race and show that the Asia–
Pacific is indeed becoming more contested, and potentially 
more volatile. It’s thus important to examine where such 
dynamics occur and what motivations dominate decisions 
to modernise. Arguably, naval and air capabilities define the 
strategic situation in the region to a large extent, although 
in some instances land forces remain more significant, 
such as in Vietnam, the Philippines, Thailand, Myanmar 
and Cambodia.
Against this background, this paper examines the arms 
acquisitions of key Asia–Pacific countries. In Northeast 
Asia, that includes China, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. 
In Southeast Asia, the paper looks at Indonesia, Singapore, 
Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Thailand. This analysis 
is used to determine potential implications for Australia’s 
strategic position in the region and for the ADF.
Regional defence expenditure—the 
‘how much’ and ‘what’
Before analysing the naval and air programs of key Asia–
Pacific countries in detail, it’s important to look at regional 
trends in defence expenditure, which are a useful macro 
indicator of whether nations are seriously concerned about 
their strategic environment.4 There are important differences 
between Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia.
Northeast Asia: more than meets the eye
Unsurprisingly, China accounts for the bulk of regional 
defence spending in Northeast Asia, accounting for 51% in 
2013 (Figure 1).
Beijing bounced back very quickly after the 2008 global 
financial crisis, and its defence expenditure has risen rapidly 
compared to the rest of Northeast Asia, where Japan, South 
Korea and Taiwan have had only minimal increases in recent 
years (Figure 2). Note that the renminbi was unpegged from 
the US dollar in 2010–11; because Figure 2 shows defence 
expenditures in current US$, Chinese expenditure seems to 
undergo an abrupt decline in that year. In constant dollars, 
China has recorded two decades of double-digit increases in 
annual defence spending.
It’s also common to look at the proportion of GDP that 
countries spend on defence. That doesn’t tell us what or 
how much they’re buying, but it’s an indicator of the relative 
priority afforded to defence and thus a proxy for strategic 
concern.  On this measure, it appears that most countries 
invest only a modest proportion of their GDP in defence, 
and in some cases there’s even been a decline (Figure 3 and 
Figure 4).
These figures suggest that there’s not much to worry about. 
It’s to be expected that China’s military expenditure will 
grow commensurate with its overall economic rise, and as a 
percentage of GDP Beijing’s spending a relatively modest sum 
on its military. Other regional countries don’t come close to 
China’s investments, and their ratio of defence spending to 
GDP also appears modest.
However, this measure doesn’t take into account the real 
value amount, which is a measure of the amount of defence 
capability that can be purchased. It also doesn’t consider the 
sophistication or type of the defence equipment acquired 
by individual countries. For example, spending on internal 
security forces is less significant for regional security than 
the acquisition of key capabilities, such as major surface 
combatants, submarines and modern aircraft.
When the types of purchases are considered, a different 
picture emerges in Northeast Asia. Arguably, South Korea’s 
defence expenditure was affected most by the global 
financial crisis, whereas Japan’s and Taiwan’s had already 
declined before the event. But what’s often overlooked is 
that after the crisis neither defence spending nor major 
equipment programs in Northeast Asian countries decreased 
or plateaued (Figure 5).
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This suggests that in Northeast Asia military programs aren’t 
influenced solely by economic performance. Rather, because 
of changing strategic dynamics, significant investments 
were made in naval and air capabilities—a sign of action–
reaction dynamics. More capable navies are being developed, 
supported by land-based aircraft for maritime surveillance 
and strike operations. As will be shown, it’s clear that 
China, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan are reacting to each 
other’s capabilities and modernisation efforts—and that US 
capabilities are a key factor as well (Figure 6).
Southeast Asia: more modest but 
increasing
The picture in Southeast Asia is more complex. Arguably, 
the South China Sea has dominated strategic rationales 
for increasing capabilities, particularly when it comes 
to submarines.5 As well, the value amount of defence 
expenditure in this region remains modest compared with 
spending in Northeast Asia.
However, it’s important to note that after the global financial 
crisis (which had significant impacts on all Southeast Asian 
countries, with the exceptions of Singapore and Indonesia), 
regional defence expenditure continued to rise. Singapore 
has retained its top position, spending an average of 5% of 
its GDP on defence and accounting for approximately 23% 
of regional defence spending. Malaysia and Thailand also 
had significant increases in percentage terms, although this 
was off relatively low bases. Indonesian spending is also 
increasing again, although again off a low base; the defence 
budget is still below 1% of GDP, as it is in the Philippines.
A comparison between military expenditure and major 
equipment programs across Southeast Asia (Figure 7) 
demonstrates a steady increase in defence spending until 
2011. However, from 2012 onwards, the number of platforms 
decreased while military expenditure continued to climb, 
indicating substantial efforts to modernise and invest in 
fewer but more capable platforms.
Yet, despite these efforts to create more effective and 
sustainable forces, Southeast Asian countries (with the 
exception of Singapore) haven’t developed the ability to 
build, operate and maintain sophisticated capabilities. 
Acquisition decisions remain haphazard and are taken with 
little or no consideration for their impact on the country’s 
overall and future force structures.
Figure 1:  Asia–Pacific military expenditure, 2013 
Source: World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers (WMEAT) series of reports, US State Department, 1995–2014.
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Figure 2:  Regional military expenditure, 1995 to 2013 (US$ billion, current)
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
PRC 32.50 36.50 40.50 44.20 48.20 50.90 56.30 61.80 68.10 77.30 85.30 97.60 118.00 143.00 146.00 155.00 170.00 146.00 162.00
Japan 31.70 33.30 34.30 34.70 35.50 45.80 40.30 39.10 42.90 45.60 44.70 42.20 41.50 47.20 51.50 53.80 60.50 59.10 51.00
ROK 11.60 12.70 12.90 12.40 13.10 13.80 12.90 14.10 15.80 17.80 22.20 25.20 27.70 26.10 24.40 27.60 30.90 29.30 31.80
ROC 6.98 7.17 7.52 7.03 6.51 8.80 7.71 7.50 7.16 7.99 7.80 7.78 8.99 8.98 9.43 9.48 9.74 10.50 10.30
Vietnam 1.10 1.20 1.17 1.15 1.17 2.11 1.55 1.41 1.48 1.65 1.77 1.88 2.05 2.27 2.34 2.67 2.69 3.30 3.80
Philippines 0.77 0.92 0.95 0.89 0.86 1.30 1.12 1.20 1.30 1.24 1.37 1.61 2.01 2.26 2.12 2.44 2.70 1.76 2.21
Indonesia 2.82 3.10 2.78 1.99 1.75 1.66 1.36 1.84 2.32 2.43 2.58 2.87 3.55 3.88 4.13 5.36 6.28 6.52 8.37
Singapore 2.72 2.92 3.45 3.97 4.20 4.40 4.60 4.63 4.68 5.02 5.52 5.76 6.34 7.16 7.90 7.73 8.52 12.30 12.30
Malaysia 1.97 1.92 1.82 1.31 1.85 1.61 1.93 2.24 2.88 2.82 3.12 3.27 3.97 4.42 3.93 3.76 4.76 4.44 5.00
Thailand 2.45 2.45 2.62 2.05 1.89 1.86 1.72 1.80 1.93 1.84 1.94 2.25 3.32 4.27 4.91 4.85 5.52 5.43 6.21
Australia 9.02 9.19 8.56 9.24 9.25 8.06 7.67 7.64 9.20 11.70 14.70 15.00 17.30 20.60 18.40 22.50 25.60 27.10 26.00
Sources: WMEAT 1995–2014 and IMF World Economic Outlook Database, October 2014.
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Figure 3:  Northeast Asia, defence spending, 1995 to 2013 (% of GDP)
Sources: WMEAT 1995–2014 and IMF World Economic Outlook Database, October 2014.
Figure 4:  Southeast Asia, defence spending, 1995 to 2013 (% of GDP)
Sources: WMEAT 1995–2014 and IMF World Economic Outlook Database, October 2014.
Figure 5:  Northeast Asia, regional comparison, 1995 to 2013
Source: WMEAT 1995–2014 and IISS Military Balance 2014.
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Figure 6:  Northeast Asia, action–reaction dynamics in the naval–air theatre
Figure 7:  Southeast Asia, regional comparison, 1995 to 2013
Source: WMEAT 1995–2014 and IISS Military Balance 2014.
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Regional defence expenditure—the 
‘why’
There are two sets of explanations of what’s driving 
Asia–Pacific countries to improve their capabilities in the 
air-maritime domain—strategic and domestic.
Strategic explanations include:
• self-reliance (the ability to operate independently when 
necessary, and with partners when required)
• the changing balance of power
• territorial disputes











The explanations aren’t mutually exclusive, and often 
reinforce each other in a country’s desire to modernise its 
platforms. In Northeast Asia, hedging against potential 
threats and the need to protect sovereignty claims have 
resulted in competitive action–reaction dynamics involving 
both counter-reaction and mirror-reaction. 
Although increased economic growth has translated into 
an increase in naval and air capabilities, it has now gone 
beyond the level needed to sustain mere modernisation. 
While the percentage of GDP spent on defence has plateaued, 
economic growth means that the real value amount and the 
technological sophistication of the equipment that these 
countries (particularly Japan) are investing in are significant.
For the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the primary 
objective of its military modernisation is to enhance its 
war-fighting capability to deter the US or other powers from 
intervening in the region (a goal explicitly mentioned in its 
defence white papers), particularly in the Taiwan Strait. For 
Japan, modernisation is motivated not only by the rapid 
modernisation of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) but also 
by Japan’s desire to normalise its defence policy. Taiwan’s 
modernisation is influenced by the need to counter China’s 
increased power projection. South Korea’s investments in 
maritime and air capabilities are arguably a reaction to Japan 
and the contest over the Takeshima/Dokdo Islands. Although 
some of its investments are directed towards a North 
Korean contingency, the development of a bluewater navy 
and long-range maritime surveillance aircraft clearly serve 
other purposes.
On the other hand, the picture in Southeast Asia is more 
complex due to a greater influence of domestic explanations 
on the modernisation process, particularly corruption and 
interagency rivalries. Arguably, the South China Sea has 
dominated strategic rationales for increasing capabilities, 
particularly submarines.6 Yet, in comparison with Northeast 
Asia, the defence expenditure of Southeast Asian countries 
remains modest. Acquisitions remain haphazard and seem 
not to take future force structure into account.
Despite efforts to create a more effective and sustainable 
force to guard national waters and EEZs, Southeast Asian 
countries show no serious willingness to engage in a naval 
arms race. With the exception of Singapore, their investments 
in prestigious platforms haven’t translated into the ability 
to build and maintain a capability. Many regional forces also 
face a serious risk that investments in very expensive and 
complex military platforms (such as submarines) lead to 




This section examines developments in the main 
regional countries.
China
The primary objective of the PRC’s military modernisation 
is to enhance its war-fighting capability to deter US air and 
naval forces from intervening in the region, particularly in 
the Taiwan Strait. The key to China’s modernisation is its 
‘counter-intervention’ strategy—or anti-access/area-denial 
(A2/AD) in Western parlance—with one major emphasis on 
its naval capabilities. While it’s only in the long term that the 
PLA and PLA Navy can challenge the US in the wider Western 
Pacific or beyond, this comprehensive strategy has begun to 
erode American military preponderance.
Hardly faltering during the global financial crisis, its defence 
budget has increased by double-digit percentages nearly 
every year since 1988—an eightfold increase over the past 
20 years. In March 2014, Beijing announced a 12.2% increase 
in its annual military budget to US$132 billion, continuing 
that trend.
Nationalist fervour plays a significant part. President Xi 
Jinping has called for the realisation of the ‘Chinese dream’ 
and for China’s recognition as a superpower akin to the US. 
The Chinese Communist Party thus places great emphasis 
on its goal to build China’s armed forces commensurate 
with the country’s international standing. The PLA Navy’s 
modernisation, which began in the 1990s, encompasses 
a broad array of weapon acquisition programs, including 
for anti-ship ballistic missiles, submarines and surface 
ships.7 China now has the world’s largest fleet of attack 
submarines (62), while the US Navy’s force fell to 53 in 2009. 
However, the American fleet is all nuclear, while most of 
China’s is diesel–electric. The PLA’s aim is also to develop a 
credible nuclear deterrent based on a triad of land-, air- and 
sea-based systems.
China also wants to develop and maintain an aircraft carrier 
capability, and the Liaoning successfully executed more than 
a hundred tests during drills in the South China Sea in 2013. In 
January 2014, Beijing announced that it will build its second 
aircraft carrier and plans to build a fleet of four, meaning that 
the PLA Navy could potentially deploy one carrier at sea at 
any given time.8 The PLA has also invested in asymmetric 
capabilities, such as DF-21D ‘carrier killer’ anti-ship ballistic 
missiles, modern fighter aircraft, anti-satellite weapons 
capabilities, modern command, control, communications, 
computer, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance 
capabilities, and supersonic cruise missiles.
Yet the question remains as to how much progress 
China has made in the production of indigenous defence 
capabilities. One of Beijing’s aims is to have an independent, 
indigenous world-class defence technology base in order 
to be independent of foreign, particularly Russian, systems. 
However, its new surface combatants, for example, 
feature a series of propulsion, command and control, 
sensor and weapons components either purchased or 
reverse-engineered from foreign sources. The PLA’s 
antisubmarine warfare capabilities, systems integration, 
propulsion design and high-tech material manufacturing 
remain weak. Rampant corruption and inefficient resource 
allocation have also limited the PLA’s ability to innovate.
Japan
In July 2014, reflecting the belief that Japan’s current defence 
policy constrains its ability to protect fundamental interests, 
the cabinet of Prime Minster Shinzo Abe announced a 
‘reinterpretation’ of Article 9 the country’s Constitution to 
allow the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) to exercise the 
right of collective self-defence under certain conditions.9 In 
April 2015, the US and Japan agreed on revised Guidelines 
for Japan–US Defense Cooperation, which could lead to an 
enhanced operational role for the JSDF.10
Fear of US abandonment and China’s rapid military 
modernisation are also key drivers of Japan’s military 
modernisation. Its Defense White Paper 2014 identifies China’s 
increased military reach as a principle factor influencing 
Japan’s defence planners. Sovereign territorial claims over 
the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, and fears of China’s increased 
power projection, have led to action–reaction dynamics 
between the JSDF’s and PLA’s modernisation programs. 
Japan is also concerned about the protection of its sea lines 
of communication due to its high dependence on seaborne 
supplies of natural resources, energy and food.11
Although the Obama administration has underscored 
the US rebalance to the region, the Defense White Paper 
recognises that there are concerns about America’s ability 
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to commit amid fiscal constraints and deepening defence 
sequestration. This is worrying for the future of the JSDF 
force structure, particularly in the naval space, as the Japan 
Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) serves as an adjunct 
to the US Navy. A key reason for investing in sophisticated 
equipment—such as ship-based SM-3 missiles, 42 F-35A Joint 
Strike Fighters (JSFs) and Aegis combat systems—was to 
signal to Washington that Tokyo is willing to invest more in 
compatible and interoperable equipment.
Despite economic stagnation, Tokyo has kept a constant 1% 
share of its GDP for military expenditure. It has also proved 
to be the most effective in the region in using expenditure for 
maintenance, modernisation and procurement. As a result, 
the JMSDF is qualitatively the most powerful navy in the 
Asia–Pacific, after the US Navy. It has invested significantly in 
surface combatants and over the next four years will increase 
the number of its submarines from 16 to 22, increasing 
both its denial capability and regional power projection. 
The JMSDF has also acquired 13 indigenously developed 
Kawasaki XP-1 maritime patrol aircraft to replace its ageing 
P-3C fleet. And, starting in the 2015 financial year, Japan will 
deploy Global Hawk unmanned reconnaissance aircraft, to be 
based at the US Air Force’s Misawa Air Base.12
However, Japan’s ability to maintain its capabilities is 
dependent on whether it can maintain its defence budget. 
If the Japanese economy remains stagnant and the yen’s 
exchange rate against the US dollar worsens, there will be 
limited funds to sustain its platforms. Moreover, the PLA and 
PLA Navy already have more vessels and aircraft than the 
JSDF. Tokyo is aware that it can neither deter nor defeat China 
without the assistance of the US.
South Korea
Seoul is more focused on North Korean contingencies and 
its regional rivalry with Japan than on responding to the ‘rise 
of China’. South Korea views itself as a rising middle power. 
Its longstanding policy on North Korea, which has continued 
under President Park Gyeun-hye, remains based on retaining 
robust deterrence and defence capabilities.
South Korea is also motivated by military prestige and status, 
as seen in its plans for regional naval power projection 
capabilities. The name of its Dokdo class of amphibious 
assault ships reveals its ambitions, as its sovereignty claim 
to the Takeshima/Dokdo Islands brings it into dispute with 
Japan. In the long term, Seoul believes it can compete with 
Tokyo in the strategic space. That has led to an action–
reaction dynamic between them.
Despite being hit hard by the Asian financial crisis in 1997 and 
the global financial crisis in 2008, by 2012 Seoul had recorded 
a rise in military expenditure for a 13th consecutive year 
and brought defence spending up to 14.8% of government 
expenditure and 2.4% of GDP. South Korea’s shipbuilding 
program is impressive. It has constructed the first of at least 
three KDX-111 Aegis- equipped destroyers, and its ninth 
Chang Bogo class submarine was delivered in 2001. It has also 
announced that it will build nine advanced German-designed 
Type 209 submarines by 2020 for intelligence and interdiction 
purposes; it currently operates twelve.13
Its highly ambitious fighter program is another modernisation 
priority. The Republic of Korea Air Force (ROKAF) plans to buy 
120 advanced fighters to replace its F-4 and F-5 fleet, having 
already bought 60 F-15K strike fighters. It will also acquire 
40 F-35A JSFs, to be delivered by 2018.14 The ROKAF has also 
announced plans to acquire four Global Hawk systems in 
addition to 20 maritime patrol aircraft.15
What makes these acquisitions potentially troubling is that 
relations between South Korea and Japan are troubled and 
will probably remain so. Deep historical cleavages are often 
exploited for domestic political gains. South Korean public 
opinion about Japan is a key influence on electoral politics 
and therefore influences foreign policy. In an April 2014 poll, 
South Koreans considered Japan to be the least favoured 
country, behind even North Korea; 65% wanted a harder-line 
government approach to addressing Japan’s claims to the 
Takeshima/Dokdo Islands, 67% opposed an expansion 
of Japan’s security role, and 79% supported increased 
security cooperation with China should US–Japan security 
cooperation increase.16 Japan’s nationalist policies could 
stress an already tense relationship.
The indefinite delay of the transfer of wartime operational 
command from the US Forces Korea to the ROK Armed 
Forces demonstrates continuing strong ties between 
the US and South Korea. However, South Korea remains 
concerned that a declining US defence budget will result in 
increasing pressures on Seoul to assume a larger share of 
common defence costs, decreasingly resilient US extended 




Taiwan’s military modernisation is motivated solely 
by its relationship with the PRC and assessments of its 
capabilities. Ties or tension across the Taiwan Strait affect 
international security, as the US continues to underwrite 
Taiwanese defence. The aim for Taiwan’s armed forces is to 
deliver an asymmetrical response to the PLA. It’s currently 
developing capabilities for air-to-air, naval-to-naval, and 
ground-to-ground defensive interdiction, as well as acquiring 
counterforce and countervalue offensive weaponry.
Taiwan’s political transition from the Democratic Progressive 
Party to the Kuomintang has meant that Taiwan has engaged 
China while simultaneously hedging through strengthening 
national military power and attempting to reinforce its 
quasi-alliance with Washington. Despite two terms of 
China-friendly President Ma Ying-Jeou, Taiwan–PRC relations 
are affected by Taiwan’s changing demographics and 
electoral system. Economic stagnation and public discontent 
over worsening social disparities have strengthened the 
belief that forging closer economic and political relations 
with China is unlikely to be beneficial for Taiwan.
Recognising this situation, since the 1990s China has 
quantitatively and qualitatively changed the cross-strait 
military balance in its favour, in case its preferential economic 
agreements fail to promote (re)unification. Openly critical of 
China’s strategy, Taiwan’s 2013 Quadrennial Defense Review 
stated that greater economic interaction had not led to 
mutual trust.17
Taiwan’s 2013 National Defense Report highlighted the impact 
of the PLA’s growing strength on the US’s ability to assist 
Taiwan should Beijing decide to mount an offensive. The 
report stated that by 2020 the PLA could be in a position to 
invade and occupy Taiwan.18 In contrast to China’s robust 
military expenditure, Taiwan’s defence budget fell to an 
all-time low of approximately 2% of GDP in 2014—well below 
Taipei’s bipartisan goal of 3%. Taiwan’s defence expenditure 
is also strained by its dual imperatives of military reform and 
major procurement programs. It has lost the quantitative and 
qualitative edge against China, and it also faces the problem 
of ageing aircraft and ships.
Taiwan’s declining demographics have added to the huge 
costs associated with setting up an all-volunteer defence 
force by 2017. Moreover, the US is reluctant to supply it with 
equipment such as JSFs and the Aegis combat system, 
mainly due to the fear of espionage. There’s also a lack 
of institutional capability to make strategy, as there’s 
no clear direction from policymakers or the Ministry of 
National Defense.
Despite its problems, Taipei is investing in its own A2/AD 
capability to counter Chinese efforts to force (re)unification. It 
has made significant investments in modernising its surface 
fleet and in developing supersonic cruise missiles, some of 
which can reach the Chinese mainland. Yet the replacement 
of its two 1960s submarines with six diesel–electric boats 
remains on Taiwan’s wish list. For maritime patrolling, the 
armed forces have also acquired 12 P-3C Orions, which can 
carry anti-ship missiles. Taiwan continues to show interest in 
modernising its ageing F-16A/B fighter jets with F-16C/Ds and 
has openly stated its goal of acquiring F-35B JSFs, despite 
Washington’s unwillingness to supply them.19
Vietnam
Vietnam is modernising its naval and air capabilities with the 
objective of deterring the Chinese in the South China Sea. Due 
to the competing territorial claims over the Spratly Islands, 
Hanoi has developed a strategy to maintain a continuous 
naval and air presence to deter China from aggressive actions 
and intimidation. Vietnam’s rapid economic growth in the 
past decade has translated into increased defence spending. 
By Southeast Asian standards, its military modernisation is 
impressive; no other country in the region has brought as 
much capability on line as quickly as Vietnam.
In December 2013, Vietnam reported the delivery of the first 
of six Russian Kilo-class conventional submarines to Cam 
Ranh Bay; the rest are to be delivered by 2016. In August 2013, 
it purchased an additional 12 Sukhoi combat aircraft from 
Russia to add to 54 that are already equipped for anti-ship 
and other maritime operations. Vietnam also acquired two 
Gepard-class frigates to bring its total to six from its current 
total of four—of which two are optimised for surface attack 
and the other two for anti-submarine warfare. It also aims 
to replace its 11 ageing Soviet-era corvettes and five frigates 
with ships purchased from India and the Netherlands. In 
July 2014, the Japanese Government announced that it 
would provide Vietnam with six naval ships for patrolling 
the South China Sea. To add extra impetus to its maritime 
11Crowded waters: Naval competition in the Asia–Pacific
modernisation, Vietnam will also acquire Russian Kh-35 
anti-ship missiles.
However, it will take years for Vietnam to complete its 
current round of modernisation and develop new doctrines 
and tactics to use the new technology. It will also have to 
maintain the platforms. The submarines have proven to be 
costly purchases, as the ongoing cost of maintaining such 
a capability wasn’t calculated properly. And Vietnam lacks 
modern command and control systems for its acquisitions. 
Although it’s attempting to develop an effective deterrent 
capability, there’s a high likelihood that it will end up with an 
unbalanced force structure.
Interservice rivalries have also emerged because of efforts to 
re-equip the navy and air force at the expense of the Vietnam 
People’s Army, which remains a core element of the political 
system led by the Communist Party of Vietnam. The army 
retains a strong role as a state institution for internal security 
and for managing the long land border with China.20
China has the quantitative and qualitative edge, and 
Vietnamese leaders remain concerned about how little 
they can deter Chinese expansion in the South China 
Sea. Vietnam’s modernisation is also heavily reliant on 
foreign, particularly Russian, military technology. While the 
Vietnamese air force is upgrading its fighters, it lacks the 
capacity to do aerial refuelling, severely limiting its ability to 
spread its reach to the Spratly Islands and back. Currently, 
Vietnam’s most robust deterrent remains its missile force, 
which includes 40 Yakhont shore-to-ship cruise missiles.
The Philippines
The Philippines faces a host of internal security challenges 
that require attention from the Philippine Army and Marine 
Corps. However, China’s growing power and assertiveness in 
the South China Sea are placing increased demands on the 
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and have exposed their 
relative weakness. In May 2013, President Benigno Aquino III 
announced a US$1.8 billion military modernisation program 
in addition to the normal defence budget, which largely pays 
personnel costs. The country’s military modernisation efforts 
have occurred under the guiding principle of ‘rebuilding while 
performing’, but it’s unlikely that the AFP will achieve either 
for the time being.21
Counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations will 
remain a focus for the AFP, despite a declining threat to 
the state and the increasing need to focus on external 
defence. Fiscal constraints also limit the scale of the AFP’s 
modernisation. Military modernisation budgets have 
consistently failed to provide the resources needed to fulfil 
the armed forces’ procurement plans.
Consequently, most equipment has been mothballed. The 
Philippines’ defence expenditure has risen only marginally 
from US$2 billion in 2010 to US$2.9 billion in 2014. As a 
percentage of GDP, however, it has fallen from 1.2% in 2010 to 
0.73% in 2014. The government and military forces also suffer 
from endemic ‘pork barrel’ corruption.22 Additionally, despite 
the withdrawal of the US military presence in 1992, the AFP 
relies mostly on US military assistance, subsidised sales 
and hand me downs.
Because it has limited funds and resources, Manila has 
decided to focus on improving its surface and naval aviation 
forces, particularly its antisubmarine warfare capabilities. 
It has negotiated with its US ally to upgrade Subic Bay and 
other military installations around the Philippines. There 
are also plans to build a new naval base, described as a ‘mini 
Subic’ and a ‘capability upgrade’, at Oyster Bay in the South 
China Sea. However, any planned upgrades are unlikely to 
credibly deter Chinese aggression in the South China Sea in 
the short term. Aquino’s administration hasn’t articulated a 
viable strategy to remodel the AFP for external operations 
while overcoming budgetary constraints.
The Philippine Air Force is almost non-existent. The last time 
it flew a fighter jet (the F-5) for training purposes was in 2005, 
and it has never flown a fighter in combat against an external 
enemy. The fighter program has only 22 combat-capable 
aircraft, which are a mix of types. Pilots also have extremely 
limited training due to the lack of money to pay for flying 
hours. To address these issues, in October 2013 the air force 
announced plans to acquire 12 FA-50 light fighters and eight 
Bell 412 combat utility helicopters to beef up its defence 
capability. However, these types of aircraft are used for 
training purposes.
The Philippine Navy is in an equally bad state. It has no 
submarine capability, and its most modern warship (BRP 
Rajah Humabon) is a former US destroyer from the WWII era. 
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The core of the Philippines naval fleet consists of seven 
Chamsuri-class patrol vessels bought from South Korea 
between 1995 and 2006.
In July 2013, the Japanese agreed to provide 10 cutters to 
help counter maritime advances by China. Also in 2013, the 
Philippines outlined plans to acquire three diesel–electric 
submarines to protect its interests in the South China Sea.23 
The navy is expected to acquire two new frigates, two or 
three fast vessels for coastal patrols and eight amphibious 
assault vessels. Nevertheless, those purchases haven’t 
brought the AFP much closer to a modern naval and 
air capability.
Indonesia
Domestic politics is the main influence on Indonesia’s military 
modernisation, and the main concerns are internal security, 
a desire for national prestige, and a highly insufficient and 
corrupt defence policy and procurement process that has led 
to the acquisition of various kinds of sophisticated military 
platforms. This has translated not into military capability 
but into an unbalanced force structure.24 The army (Tentara 
Nasional Indonesia Angkatan Darat, TNI-AD) has a strong 
role in the modernisation process but has proven the most 
resistant to change of all the services, as it has the most 
resources to lose in modernisation efforts focused on the air 
and maritime domains.
Indonesia’s defence spending has grown considerably 
in recent years but still remains below 1% of GDP. The 
first stage of its defence development program to build 
essential forces by 2024 is to allocate a sufficient budget 
for the navy, army and air force for the replacement and 
modernisation of military equipment. However, it’s beginning 
to address concerns about its external security environment, 
particularly across its vast EEZ.
It’s clear that Indonesia’s force modernisation is a reaction to 
keep up with developments in Southeast Asia. Indonesia has 
seen Malaysia as a ‘peer competitor’ since the two countries 
had a naval stand-off in June 2009 over the resource-rich 
‘Ambalat block’ in the Sulawesi Sea. Singapore’s also a 
source of disquiet for Jakarta because of its technologically 
superior forces. To address these challenges, Indonesia aims 
to have a 274-ship greenwater navy, 10 fighter squadrons and 
12 diesel–electric submarines.
In its bid to modernise its 213-ship naval fleet—of which 
half is no longer seaworthy—Indonesia procured three 
British-made frigates in 2012. The navy is also modernising its 
vessels, equipping four Ahmad-Yani Van Speijk-class guided 
missile frigates and one Kapitan Pattimura (Parchim I)-class 
corvette with stealth radars. The navy’s also cooperating with 
the Chinese on supersonic cruise missiles.
In 2012, Indonesia’s Ministry of Defense announced plans 
to acquire 12 new diesel-electric submarines by 2020; this 
was considered the number needed to cover strategic 
chokepoints around the archipelago.25 The Defense Minister 
signalled that this was a reaction to Malaysia’s acquisition 
of two Scorpene-class submarines.26 In the air domain, 
Indonesia’s attempting to modernise its ageing F-16A/B and 
F-5E/F fighters. In 2003 and 2007, it purchased 16 Su-27s 
from the Russians, and has since augmented them with 
24 refurbished F-16C/Ds from the US Air Force.
This is still a relatively low investment in naval and air 
capabilities, and most of Jakarta’s modernisation plans 
are overambitious. Unlike concerted efforts to translate 
expensive purchases into air and maritime capability, as in 
Vietnam and the Philippines, Indonesia’s force modernisation 
efforts will leave its military with an unbalanced force 
structure and no long-term funds or resources to maintain 
naval or air capabilities.
Singapore
Since the 1960s, the primary aim of Singapore’s force 
modernisation has been to deter Malaysia and Indonesia 
from interfering with the city-state’s sovereign prerogatives 
and vital economic interests. Like Australia’s forces, the 
Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) apply the principle of 
‘technological superiority’; that is, having the best equipment 
but a numerically small force.27 Due to Singapore’s persistent 
sense of vulnerability, the SAF has contributed to Southeast 
Asia’s modernisation trend, especially in its bid to create the 
‘Third Generation SAF’.28
The SAF has benefited from steadily increasing defence 
expenditure and the gradual development of a substantial 
indigenous defence industry capable of producing and 
modifying equipment for national purposes. Singapore’s 
recent procurements indicate serious efforts to enhance its 
naval and air capabilities.
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The Republic of Singapore Navy already fields a balanced and 
professional force. It operates six stealth frigates and four 
landing platform dock ships, and is examining the possibility 
of acquiring larger amphibious ships.29 In November 2012, 
Singapore announced that it had signed a contract for the 
purchase of two new Type 218SG conventional submarines 
to join its two refurbished Archer-class submarines. It also 
has some of the most advanced antisubmarine warfare 
capabilities in the region, although most of its neighbours 
don’t have the naval technology to pose a credible threat.
In September 2013, the Republic of Singapore Air Force 
confirmed that it will fit its 74 F-16C/Ds with improved radar, 
and in the past year has boosted its F-15SG multirole fighter 
fleet from 24 to 40 aircraft to replace its ageing F-5S fighters. 
Since 2011, the air force has been seriously considering the 
F-35B JSF as its next-generation fighter; it is expected that it 
will purchase from 70 to 100.30
Despite its relatively small size and its reliance on reservists 
and conscripts for the bulk of its military personnel, the 
SAF stands out as the most impressive in Southeast Asia. 
Singapore’s consistent investment in defence procurement, 
its rising defence research and industrial establishment 
and its emphasis on doctrinal development have made its 
military the best-equipped in the region.
Malaysia
Notwithstanding Malaysia’s economic ties with China, the 
Malaysian Defence Ministry has voiced increasing concern 
about tensions in the South China Sea, where Malaysia is a 
competing claimant. In October 2013, it announced the aim 
of developing a marine corps for amphibious operations, as 
well as a naval base at Bintulu in the South China Sea, close to 
waters claimed by China, to protect the surrounding area and 
oil reserves.31
Consequently, the development of air and maritime forces 
has been a key feature of Malaysia’s military modernisation; 
however, its efforts face many challenges. The Malaysian 
Armed Forces’ primary focus has always been on internal 
security, particularly counterinsurgency operations. Its 
defence acquisition process is also quite corrupt due to 
political patronage. This has affected the acquisition of 
further submarines to add to its two Scorpene-class boats 
purchased from France.
Its force modernisation also suffers from a lack of funds, 
meaning that most projects announced by the Ministry of 
Defence will not be implemented and Malaysia will face 
a capability gap. The Royal Malaysian Navy is to acquire 
six Second Generation Patrol Vessel – Littoral Combat 
Ships, but the first ship will arrive only in 2017. There have 
been moves by the US to offer surplus Perry-class frigates 
decommissioned by the US Navy, but they have stalled 
pending the approval of funding. The air force’s acquisition 
of 18 multi-role combat aircraft to replace its ageing MiG-29s 
(which were due to be retired by 2009) is also stalled due to 
budget constraints.
Thailand
Bangkok’s focus remains on internal issues in which the Army 
is central, especially since the 2014 military coup paved the 
way for the military junta-led government of General Prayut 
Chan-o-cha. Thailand faces a decades-long Muslim-Malay 
separatist insurgency in the south of the country and 
has a history of political violence and coups. Corruption, 
supply-side pressures and nationalism, as opposed to serious 
consideration of its external security environment, are driving 
its military modernisation.
In October 2013, Thailand announced its intention to 
purchase three submarines as part of a 10-year procurement 
process, and a submarine fleet headquarters at Sattahip 
Naval Base is to be completed by 2014.32 Bangkok 
referred to the submarine programs of its neighbours 
when it emphasised the need to add submarines to its 
naval capabilities.33
Although the Royal Thai Navy has a desire to be a bluewater 
force and increase its presence in the Andaman Sea, that’s 
not likely to happen. Its only aircraft carrier, HTMS Chakri 
Naruebet, is operational only one day per month for training—
the rest of the time it’s a part-time tourist attraction. New 
ships, including two frigates from South Korea, have been 
purchased but will mainly be used for anti-piracy operations.
There have been marginal improvements in the air domain. 
The Royal Thai Air Force is one of the best equipped and 
best trained in Southeast Asia, due to regular exercises with 
its US, Australian and Singaporean counterparts. In 2010, it 
announced plans to upgrade its F-16A/B fleet to extend the 
fleet’s life to 2025, and in March 2013 the government agreed 
to fund a second batch of six aircraft.
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However, despite these efforts, the Thai military’s 
entanglement in domestic politics overwhelms its efforts to 
sustain and modernise operational capability. In 2014, for the 
first time, it wasn’t invited to RIMPAC. The US has cut military 
aid, raising questions about Thailand’s future as a US ally.
Implications for Australia
This section examines implications of Asian military 
modernisation programs for the Australian Government and 
the ADF.
A more dangerous neighbourhood?
The dynamics of regional military modernisation indicate 
that the future security environment in the Western Pacific 
will only become more contested. Northeast Asia’s already 
caught up in action–reaction dynamics. China’s responding to 
American military preponderance in the region, while Japan’s 
responding to China, particularly over the disputed Senkaku/
Diaoyu Islands. South Korea’s showing evidence of reacting to 
Japan, as its pattern of acquisitions demonstrates that it’s no 
longer focused solely on North Korean contingencies.
In the context of the US alliance framework in the region, 
the build-up of capabilities in friendly countries (Japan, 
South Korea and Singapore) could be beneficial to Australia. 
Whether it’s a reaction to China or a form of hedging, it has 
created a counterbalance to the PRC.
In Southeast Asia, it’s evident that Vietnam is making 
concerted efforts to respond to China’s aggressive stance in 
the South China Sea and is investing in its air and maritime 
capabilities. Singapore’s force modernisation also indicates 
hedging with the US and its allies. Indonesia, the Philippines, 
Malaysia and Thailand have acknowledged the need to 
modernise their air and maritime capabilities, but their 
processes are haphazard and haven’t taken into account the 
long-term maintenance required for sophisticated platforms.
Nevertheless, at a minimum, Southeast Asian force 
modernisation will increase the chances of a ‘lucky punch’. 
The introduction of more advanced platforms is problematic 
for ADF planning. For example, it has led to the proliferation 
of submarines as an asymmetric and disruptive technology, 
and to anti-ship cruise missiles that can be fired from even 
smaller vessels. This could have quite a dramatic effect on the 
survivability of ADF surface vessels.
Stability in maritime Southeast Asia is central to Australian 
defence policy. While there may be an emerging arms race in 
Northeast Asia, the scale of it means that the ADF won’t be a 
decisive player, although it might be able to help bolster other 
forces. It’s the haphazard force modernisation of Southeast 
Asia that will pose problems for the future force structure of 
the ADF. The proliferation of systems such as submarines and 
anti-ship cruise missiles could increase regional instability 
and pose problems for forward-deployed forces.
The ADF: losing the capability edge?
Since the Vietnam War, the ADF has aimed not only at aligning 
with US forces, but also at maintaining a small force that’s 
technologically superior to those of all Southeast Asian 
countries, especially when it comes to air and maritime 
power. If action–reaction dynamics and an arms race lead 
to regional countries closing the gap, that would directly 
affect the basic tenets of ADF force planning and structure. 
Although a direct attack on Australia remains unlikely, the 
defensive advantage of our geography could be eroded by 
the introduction of more advanced platforms in Southeast 
Asia and by potential conflict between major powers in 
Northeast Asia.
The implications are significant. If the Australian Government 
were to deploy our forces in Southeast Asia, the ADF could 
face more sophisticated capabilities. While the ADF won’t lose 
its capability edge in Southeast Asia in the medium term, in 
the short term investments in certain platforms increase the 
chance of a ‘lucky punch’. For instance, Indonesia is testing 
supersonic missiles from its frigates and putting Chinese 
anti-ship cruise missiles on fast attack craft. In the future, 
with rising economic growth, Southeast Asian countries 
will be likely to overcome problems such as maintenance 
and logistics and increase their combat capability through 
improved situational awareness and better command and 
control systems.
The 2015 Defence White Paper will need to address how the 
ADF will modernise its own air and maritime capabilities 
in a neighbourhood that’s becoming more complex, but 
that doesn’t mean restructuring or planning for a war 
against China or a Southeast Asian country. Rather, future 
force structuring should continue to pursue the objective 
of maintaining a small but technologically superior force 
capable of supporting allied operations in the broader region. 
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However, emphasis needs to be placed on the changing 
strategic environment in Southeast Asia.
We need to ensure that our investments translate into 
long-term naval and air capabilities that can exploit potential 
shortfalls, and that they don’t result in an unbalanced force 
structure similar to those of many of our neighbours. That 
is, as well as investing in regional technological superiority 
in defence, we need to invest in training and research 
to maintain expensive acquisitions and turn them into 
sophisticated capabilities.
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